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Although code review is an essential step for ensuring the quality of software, it is surprising that current code review systems do not have mechanisms to protect the integrity of the code review process. We uncover multiple attacks against the code review infrastructure which are easy to execute, stealthy in nature, and can have a significant impact, such as allowing malicious or buggy code to be merged and propagated to future releases. To improve this status quo, in this work we lay the foundations for securing the code review process. Towards this end, we first identify a set of key design principles necessary to secure the code review process. We then use these principles to propose SecureReview, a security mechanism that can be applied on top of a Git-based code review system to ensure the integrity of the code review process and provide verifiable guarantees that the code review process followed the intended review policy. We implement SecureReview as a Chrome browser extension for GitHub and Gerrit. Our security analysis shows that SecureReview is effective in mitigating the aforementioned attacks. An experimental evaluation shows that the SecureReview implementation only adds a slight storage overhead (i.e., less than 0.0006 of the repository size). 

Software supply chain compromises are on the rise. From the effects of XCodeGhost to SolarWinds, hackers have identified that targeting weak points in the supply chain allows them to compromise high-value targets such as U.S. government agencies and corporate targets such as Google and Microsoft. Software signing, a promising mitigation for many of these attacks, has seen limited adoption in open-source and enterprise ecosystems. In this paper, we propose Sigstore, a system to provide widespread software signing capabilities. To do so, we designed the system to provide baseline artifact signing capabilities that minimize the adoption barrier for developers. To this end, Sigstore leverages three distinct mechanisms: First, it uses a protocol similar to ACME to authenticate developers through OIDC, tying signatures to existing and widely-used identities. Second, it enables developers to use ephemeral keys to sign their artifacts, reducing the inconvenience and risk of key management. Finally, Sigstore enables user authentication by means of artifact and identity logs, bringing transparency to software signatures. Sigstore is quickly becoming a critical piece of Internet infrastructure with more than 2.2M signatures over critical software such as Kubernetes and Distroless. 

This paper systematizes knowledge about secure software supply chain patterns. It identifes four stages of a software supply chain attack and proposes three security properties crucial for a secured supply chain: transparency, validity, and separation. The paper de- scribes current security approaches and maps them to the proposed security properties, including research ideas and case studies of supply chains in practice. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches relative to known attacks and details the various security frameworks put out to ensure the security of the software supply chain. Finally, the paper highlights potential gaps in actor and operation-centered supply chain security techniques.